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RES JUDICATA AND FOREIGN
COUNTRY JUDGMENTS
COURTLAND H. PETERSON*
The historical development of American law with respect to the
treatment of foreign country judgments has already received the atten-
tion of several writers and therefore need not be repeated in detail
here.' A brief review of the main currents of this development, how-
ever, will help to focus attention on the modern problems with which
this article proposes to deal.
For the first half or three-quarters of a century after the founding
of the Republic, courts in the United States contented themselves with
regarding most foreign country adjudication as a rather ordinary
species of evidence.2 The basic principle, borrowed by the new states
with considerable uniformity from the English cases,3 was that a
foreign judgment could be received in later litigation in a new forum,
but it was there to be treated only as prima facie evidence of the
matters earlier adjudged.4 Under this rule the court to which a judg-
ment was offered for enforcement or recognition was not precluded
from a complete re-examination of the merits of the underlying cause
of action.
Gradually, however, the content of this rule began to change, and
the general direction of change was toward giving foreign adjudication
a more conclusive effect. Several post-Revolution English cases were
influential in this respect,' but there were other causes as well.6 At any
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1 Smit, "International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States," 9
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44, 48-56 (1962); Yntema, "The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Anglo-American Law," 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129-1148 (1935).
2 Burnham v. Webster, 4 Fed. Cas. 781 (No. 2179) (D. Me. 1846); Buttrick v.
Allen, 8 Mass. 273, 5 Am. Dec. 105 (1811). Cf. Cummings v. Banks, 2 Barb. 602 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1848). See Bimeler v. Dawson, 10 Ill. (4 Scam.) 536, 539, 540 (1843) (dictum);
McKim v. Odom, 12 Me. 94, 95 (135) (dictum); Draper's Ex'rs v. Gorman, 35 Va.
(8 Leigh) 628, 637 (1837) (dictum). But see Boston India Rubber Factory v. Hoit, 14
Vt. 92, 95, 96 (1842) (dictum). A few cases laid down the same rule for sister-state
judgments before interpretation of the full faith and credit clause settled their conclusive
effect. See, e.g, Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. R. 157, 3 Am. Dec. 469 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
3 The leading English case appears to have been Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug. 1, 99
Eng. Rep. I (K.B. 1778) (opinion by Lord Mansfield). The earlier English view was
that foreign judgments had to be recognized as a matter of international law. Cottington's
Case, 2 Swanst. 326, 36 Eng. Rep. 640 (H.L. 1678).
4 See cases cited note 2 supra.
G Martin v. Nicolls, 3 Sim. 458, 57 Eng. Rep. 1070 (Ch. 1830); Henderson v.
Henderson, 11 Q.B. 1015, 116 Eng. Rep. 752 (1848).
6 A substantial number of the early American cases involved foreign admiralty de-
291
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
rate, the tendency toward greater conclusiveness was expressly recog-
nized by many American courts before the end of the nineteenthi
century. 7
The elevation of foreign judgments to a stature above that of prima
facie evidence made it obvious that some method of limiting and defin-
ing their degree of conclusiveness was essential. Almost none of the
states could be induced to accord to foreign judgments that same de-
gree of conclusiveness required by the American constitution for sister
state judgments.8 But if foreign judgments were to be entitled to less
than full faith and credit, yet given more effect than other kinds of
evidence, how were the limits of conclusiveness to be determined?
The American courts took two approaches to this problem. The
first, a rather sensible one, was to start from the hypothesis that foreign
judgments were conclusive, and then to list specific defenses which
could be raised to defeat that conclusiveness.0 Such enumerated de-
fenses included lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court, procurement
of the foreign judgment by fraud, and clear mistake of fact or law in
crees, which were generally thought to be entitled to conclusive effect as a matter of
international law. Brown v. Union Ins. Co., 4 Am. Dec. 204 (Conn. 1810); Cheriot v.
Foussat, 3 Binn. 220 (Pa. 1810); cf. Jenkins v. Putnam, I S.C.L. 8, 1 Am. Dec. 594
(S.C. Super. Ct. 1784). But see Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 451
(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1802). Judges apparently began to doubt the logic of giving conclusive
effect to such decrees while the judgments of equally respectable foreign municipal courts
were accorded less deference. Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 Fed. Cas. 1184 (No.
1793) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) ; Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568, 572 (1876). Foreign judgments
raised by a defendant in bar seem to have been given conclusive effect from the outset as
an exception to the prima face evidence rule, and the discriminatory effect of this dis-
tinction may have troubled some courts. Baker v. Palmer, supra; Rapelje v. Emery, 2
DalI. 231 (Pa. 1795). Curiously enough, the courts seem to have assumed for a very long
time that a foreign judgment was conclusive if raised only collaterally. Williams v.
Preston, 25 Ky. (3 J.J. Marsh.) 600, 20 Am. Dec. 179 (1830) (dictum); MacDonald v.
Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 71 N.H. 448, 52 AtI. 982 (1902); Monroe v. Douglas, 4 Sandf.
Ch. 126 (N.Y. 1846), aff'd, 5 N.Y. 447 (1851); Smith v. Lewis, supra note 2 (dictum).
But cf. Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493, 506 (Del. 1960); Smit, supra note 1, at 69-74.
7 Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895); Christian & Craft Grocery Co. v.
Coleman, 125 Ala. 158, 27 So. 786 (1900); Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91,
34 AtI. 714 (1895); Baker v. Palmer, supra note 6; Thorn v. Saimonson, 37 Kan. 441,
15 Pac. 588 (1887); Jones v. Jamison, 15 La. Ann. 35 (1860); Lazier v. Westcott, 26
N.Y. 146, 82 Am. Dec. 404 (1862); Eastern Townships Bank v. Beebe, 53 Vt. 177, 38
Am. Rep. 665 (1880).
8 But see 2 Projet La. Prac. Code of 1825, art. 746, at 118 (1936). This provision
made sister-state and foreign judgments (other than default judgments) equivalent to
domestic judgments even in the sense of being immediately executory. Although the pro-
vision for executory process appears to have been repealed in 1846, this was interpreted
as not depriving foreign judgments of conclusive effect. Jones v. Jamison, supra note 7.
9 Baker v. Palmer, supra note 6; Lazier v. Westcott, supra note 7; Banco Minero
v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915); Draper's Exr's v. Gorman, supra note 2.
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the rendition of the judgment."° With a few important exceptions, how-
ever, implementation of this approach in the case law has never pro-
gressed much beyond this rudimentary formulation.
The essence of the alternative approach was to ignore the problem
of definition. This was accomplished by shifting the emphasis away
from the degree of effect to be given, and to put it instead on the
problem of justification for giving any effect at all. The concept, ready
at hand to serve this function, was the undefined and virtually unde-
finable principle of the comity of nations." It was a doctrine of con-
siderable antiquity, having already served somewhat the same purpose
in relation to the older prima facie evidence rule.' Reliance upon it in
written opinions thus assured an aura of respectability while at the
same time permitting the judge to reach almost any result he wished.
Its almost infinite capacity for expansion and contraction, and its
corresponding weakness as a tool for the prediction of case results, is
apparent on the face of its most often quoted "definition":
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another na-
tion, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.13
Thus conceived, as hanging somewhere between duty and courtesy, the
doctrine of comity also left the status of foreign judgments in limbo
between full faith and credit on the one hand and ordinary evidentiary
effect on the other.
Had these two approaches remained distinct, the American law
on this subject might have achieved a more rational development. But
there is at least a certain plausibility in combining them, using comity
10 See notes 86-97 infra.
"1 For an excellent discussion of the comity doctrine in connection with foreign
judgments see Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 160-66 (1962). One of the obvious problems
in defining comity is that it has been used rather loosely to mean quite different things.
In the sense of its relevance here, it seems to have developed partly from the notion
that domestic and foreign courts are co-ordinate; see an attempted definition of comity
used in this sense in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900)
(holding the federal circuit courts not bound to follow decisions of other circuits except
on comity basis). The courts seem to have assumed without discussion that the highest
court of one country is "co-ordinate" with the trial courts of another country. An early
expression of doubt about the comity doctrine appears in Walton v. Bethune, 4 S.C.L.
453, 4 Am. Dec. 597 (S.C. Ct. App. 1811).
12 2 Kent, Commentaries *120.
13 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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to justify the hypothesis of conclusiveness and using the enumeration
of defenses as a brake upon conclusiveness. The product of this combi-
nation, however, was a leaky concept which permitted defenses to in-
filtrate at both ends. As the cases illustrate, a foreign judgment could
be rejected simply on the ground that comity does not require recogni-
tion,14 without reference to any of the enumerated defenses. In this
respect comity may be viewed as having introduced not only an ex-
tremely elastic public policy defense but also the requirement of reci-
procity. The latter concept has been severely criticized and largely
discredited,15 although its ghost still walks.' 6 As for the public policy
defense, it remains the most unmanageable and least predictable of all
objections raised to the recognition of foreign judgments. Since a re-
jection of conclusiveness could be made by attacking the rationale for
the hypothesis of conclusiveness, there was little point in trying to
clarify the scope of the particular defenses which had been enumerated.
The result was to arrest the development of clear analysis. At any rate,
this amalgam of comity and enumerated defenses did occur, and that
mixture reflects with considerable accuracy the status of American case
authority even today..
Before turning to a closer consideration of the state of the law in
the United States, it will be well to note a similar shift toward con-
14 See Perdikouris v. The S.S. Olympos, 185 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1960); Grey v.
Independent Order of Foresters, 196 S.W. 779 (Mo. App. 1917) ; Fantony v. Fantony, 21
N.J. 525, 122 A.2d 593 (1956); Bittson v. Bittson, 7 App. Div. 2d 868, 182 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1959); Ex parte Dawson, 3 Bradf. 130 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1855). Cf. Ogden v. Ogden,
159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1948) ; Clubb v. Clubb, 402 Ill. 390, 84 N.E.2d 366 (1949) ;
In re Kohn's Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Surr. Ct. 1953); Perkins v. DeWitt, 197 M.,isc.
369, 94 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 279 App. Div. 906, 111
N.Y.S.2d 752 (1952).
15 As introduced by Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 13, the reciprocity requirement was
restricted to in personam judgments involving American nationals where the foreign pro-
ceedings were not initiated by the American party. But even on this limited basis,
practically all writers have condemned the doctrine as neither useful nor wise. See Smit,
supra note 1, at 49-50, and critics cited therein. Perhaps the strongest argument in
favor of the reciprocity rule is made on the theory that it allows selective recognition
and enforcement, and thus nonrecognition of judgments of countries with imperfectly de-
veloped judicial systems or with judicial officials suspected of partiality. Gutteridge,
"Reciprocity in Regard to Foreign Judgments," 13 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 49, 66 (1932).
16 Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 524,
§ 11 (Supp. 1961).
17 See, e.g., Applewhaite v. The S.S. Sunprincess, 150 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Finance Corp., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 527, 25 A.2d 383
(1942) (dictum); Application of Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959);
Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893) ; Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203,
50 N.E.2d 889 (1943); Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933).
But see Coulbom v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.2d 576 (1943) (res judicata theory).
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clusiveness in the English law. This was chiefly accomplished by the
formulation of the so-called obligation theory, 8 which parallels the
American use of the comity doctrine. The obligation theory predicates
the enforcement of foreign judgments upon the acquisition of rights
under the foreign legal system, or, for the local law theorist, predicates
the creation of rights in the forum on whether or not such rights were
created in the foreign system. Although this approach has much in
common with the vested rights theory of conflicts still predominant in
American case law, only a few courts in the United States seem to have
adopted its terminology for the treatment of foreign judgments. 9
Two MISCONCEPTIONS
Two common misconceptions about foreign country judgments
should be dispelled at the outset. The first of these is that cases involv-
ing such judgments "are extremely rare in this country."20 Professor
Nussbaum arrived at that conclusion principally from an examination
of case digests covering the period from 1896 to 1936. By defining
foreign divorce out of the picture (no reason given), as well as foreign
probate (because this involves judicial administration rather than ad-
judication), he found only twenty-six cases involving foreign country
judgments during this forty-year period.2' Subsequent writers have
acquiesced in this evaluation of the frequency of the cases.22
It must be conceded that the poor organization of the digests with
respect to this subject matter makes exhaustive research difficult, and
in any event "rarity" is a relative matter. Even so, it is clear that there
are many more such cases than Professor Nussbaum's survey indicated.
The present writer has found at least seventy-four reported American
cases involving foreign adjudication during that same period, and this
collection may not be complete. This total excluded all cases involving
status or probate matters; if the latter are included, as they should be,23
18 See generally Read, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1938).
19 Mellin v. Horlick, 31 Fed. 865 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1887); Glass v. Blackwell, 48 Ark.
50, 2 S.W. 257 (1886); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381,
152 N.E. 121 (1926). Later cases in New York suggest that the courts there have returned
to the terminology of comity. See, e.g., International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co.,
6 N.Y.2d 406, 160 N.E.2d 656 (1959); Ross v. Ostrander, 192 Misc. 140, 79 N.Y.S.2d 706
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
20 Nussbaum, "Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments," 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221, 237
(1941).
21 Ibid.
22 Smit, supra note 1; Reese, "The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad," 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783 (1950) ; Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 11, at 165.
23 See notes 43-45 infra.
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the total jumps to 130, or more than three reported cases per year for
the forty years preceding 1936.
More to the point, however, is the fact that the number of foreign
judgment cases since 1936 has grown substantially. Including all types,
the present writer has found 288 such cases in the twenty-five year
period 1937-1962, or a rate of more than eleven per year. Even exclud-
ing the staggering mass of Mexican divorce cases in the New York
reports,2 4 the annual rate of foreign country judgment cases has sub-
stantially more than doubled since the period of which Professor Nuss-
baum wrote.25 Taking into consideration a suitable multiplier for un-
reported cases, it seems safe to conclude that the problems presented
are far from purely academic.
The other misconception needing clarification is the notion that
California is the only state with legislation on this subject, and that the
effect to be given to foreign judgments in other states is therefore purely
a matter of judge-made law.26 It is true that California has a rather
sweeping provision, but there are in addition numerous statutes in other
states which bear either directly or indirectly upon the treatment of
foreign adjudication. No complete catalog of these provisions can be
undertaken here, but it will be useful to indicate at least the relevant
types of statutes.
There are, first of all, statutes in many states which provide
methods of authenticating and proving foreign judgments2 7 Few, if
any, of these statutes attempt to measure the amount or quality of
effect to be given to judgments proved under them; indeed, the New
York statute expressly provides that nothing therein "is to be construed
as declaring the effect of a record or other judicial proceeding of a
24 The writer has found 102 reported cases in the New York courts involving
Mexican divorces. Although the opinions are extremely repetitious, they are instructive
both as to the variety of settings in which foreign status judgments may be raised and
also as to the treatment given to foreign judgments rendered with jurisdiction over the
parties but without jurisdiction of the subject matter. See note 134 infra.
25 Excluding the Mexican divorce cases in the New York reports, the annual rate is
now about seven cases. A fairly high percentage of these cases involve status problems;
if status and probate matters are excluded, the rate has not increased appreciably over
the 1896-1936 period.
26 Nadelmann, "The United States of America and Agreements on Reciprocal En-
forcement of Foreign judgments," 1 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 156, 159 (1953); Smit, supra
note 1, at 48. Cf. Ehrenzweig, op. cit. supra note 11, at 165.
27 Some of the proof statutes refer expressly to foreign country judgments; e.g.,
Iowa Code Ann. § 622.55 (1946); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2541 (West 1961); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 1698 (1958). Others are clearly broad enough to include such judgments as
a matter of interpretation. Even where the statute specifically refers to other "states," it
may furnish an analogue against which rules for foreign judgments can be judicially
created. Cf. Gautier Steel Co., 2 Pa. County Ct. 399, 400 (C.P. 1886).
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foreign country." 8 But even in the face of such a provision, and
certainly in its absence, the permissible inference would seem to be that
normally some effect will be given.
A second class of statutes deals more directly with the effect to
be given to foreign adjudication. At one end of the spectrum is the
famous California code provision which equates the effect of foreign
judgments with that of California and sister-state judgments. 29 At the
other extreme is a Maryland statute, dating from 1813, which denies
conclusive evidentiary effect to any foreign judgmrnent except as to the
"cacts or doings" of the foreign tribunal itself.30 In between these poles
lie a variety of diverse enactments. The statutes of California, Oregon
and Montana give conclusive effect to foreign admiralty decrees.," The
Oregon and Montana provisions also require conclusive effect to be
given to foreign adjudications of title.32 Maryland seems to do likewise,
by specifically excepting from the restrictive provision already noted
"the legal effects . . . on the property affected or intended to be af-
fected thereby. " 33 The Oregon and Montana statutes give foreign in
personam judgments the effect of a rebuttable presumption, but at the
same time limit the matters which can be raised to rebut the presump-
tion.34 New Hampshire, in a recent statute, offers "faith and credit"
to Canadian judgments on a strict reciprocity basis3 5 Delaware ap-
proves the rules of "international comity" for recognition of foreign
divorce and annulment decrees, but without attempting to define
comity.38 Statutes of still other states deal with foreign decrees involv-
ing status and support,3 7 the permissibility of attacks for lack of juris-
diction or notice,3 and procedure to be followed when the foreign
28 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 397. This provision is omitted from the new New York
Civil Practice Law and Rules § 4542, which goes into effect September 1, 1963, but infer-
ences to be drawn from its omission are probably not important in view of the numerous
New York cases on the subject.
29 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1915. On the background of this provision see Lorenzen,
"The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale LJ. 188, 204-205 (1919).
30 Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 39 (1957).
31 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1914; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1001-24 (1947); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 43.200 (1961).
32 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1001-27 (1947); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 43.190 (1961).
33 Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 39 (1957).
34 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-1001-27 (1947); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 43.190 (1961).
Both of these provisions limit the defenses to ". . . want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact."
35 N.H. Rev. Stat. ch. 524, § 11 (Supp. 1961).
36 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1511 (1953).
37 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-4-1 (1953). But see Minnear v. Minnear, 131 Colo.
313, 281 P.2d 517 (1955).
38 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:82-4 (1952).
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judgment upon which a domestic judgment has been rendered is
reversed or set aside. 9
A third class is composed of those statutes which are not expressly
applicable to either foreign or sister-state judgments, but which may be
applied to such judgments as a matter of judicial interpretation. The
possibilities for statutory treatment of foreign judgments by this route
are fairly numerous, since statutory definitions of "judgments," "res
judicata" or "the effect of judgments" are not uncommon. 0 *To the
extent that they are not limited either expressly or by context to
domestic application, all such provisions have a potential application to
foreign judgments.4
Still another type of statute having an important although in-
direct effect on foreign adjudication consists of those provisions declar-
ing the public policy of the state.4" As already noted, one of the
recognized defenses to conclusiveness of a foreign judgment is that the
underlying cause of action upon which it is founded contravenes the
public policy of the recognition forum. Statutes which outlaw specific
causes of action, therefore, are potential statutory defenses to foreign
judgments founded on such causes.
A last group of statutes deserving mention consists of those con-
cerned with foreign wills and foreign probate. These statutes are nu-
merous and diverse;43 no attempt will be made here to analyze or classify
them. The present concern is merely to emphasize the necessity of
including this category of cases in any comprehensive analysis of
foreign judgments. While it may be true that in many instances pro-
ceedings in estate matters are administrative rather than adjudicative,
it is equally clear that a contested foreign estate proceeding is adjudica-
tive in the fullest sense of the word.' Even in the noncontested cases,
at least those in which notice and opportunity to be heard are given,
39 Ariz. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 60(d) (1956).
40 See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2285, 2286 (1951).
41 See, e.g., Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La. 726, 189 So. 116 (1939), construing
the provisions cited in note 40 supra.
42 See, e.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-2905 (1933). This provision, aimed at outlawing
cognovit notes and similar contracts, has more than an indirect effect since it refers
specifically to foreign countries.
43 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-341 (1956) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-6-1
(1957); Uniform Probate of Foreign Wills Act § 1, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 391
(1957). See generally Atkinson, "The Uniform Ancillary Administration and Probate
Acts," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 619 (1954).
44 American courts have felt free to re-examine the question of domicile as the
jurisdictional basis for a foreign probate, but if the issue of domicile were litigated in the
foreign proceeding a different result might follow. See In re Lockwood's Will, 147
N.Y.S.2d 106 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
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there is at least as much reason to speak of such proceedings as foreign
judgments as there is to classify foreign default money judgments in
the same way. Separate rules for the treatment of all foreign default
judgments may be necessary depending on the nature of the proceed-
ings in which they originate, but this class of cases cannot simply be
ignored by calling it administrative4 Similar considerations apply to
foreign intestate proceedings, although the latter appear to be dealt
with less frequently by statute.
MODERN AMERICAN THEORY
The picture of American law which emerges from this mixed bag
of statutes and legal theories is not a scene of confusion. Thanks in
part to cases and statutes but mostly to the careful work of a few legal
scholars,46 the rules for the treatment of foreign judgments have been
mapped out in some detail. At least when public policy defenses have
been measured by the positive law of the recognition forum rather than
by the length of the chancellor's foot,4 7 a fair degree of predictability
has been obtained. This has not been achieved wholly at the expense
of justice in particular cases, for it is difficult to condemn very many
modern American cases in this field on the ground that the result was
clearly wrong. The general pattern to be observed from the cases is one
of enforcement and recognition,48 and, except perhaps for our tempo-
rary adventure with the requirement of reciprocity, the long period of
political isolationism in this country does not appear to have caused
any serious political distortion of case results.49
There is, nevertheless, growing need for a re-evaluation of this
subject matter, a need made more urgent by the increasing frequency
of the cases. The clear disposition of both courts and legal scholars to
conduct the analysis of these problems at the level of mechanical rules
hoists a flag warning of future misdirection. The unfortunate results
which almost inevitably follow the failure to articulate reasons or poli-
cies underlying legal rules are already found in some of the American
45 But see Nussbaum, supra note 20, at 237.
46 Piggott, Foreign Judgments and Jurisdiction (3d ed. 1908) ; Reese, supra note 22;
Wigmore, "The Execution of Foreign Judgments," 21 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1926); Yntema,
supra note 1. See also Read, op. cit. supra note 18 (dealing with the common-law units of
the English Commonwealth).
47 Compare Zanzonico v. Neeld, 17 N.J. 490, 111 A.2d 772 (1955), with In re
Gillies' Estate, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951).
48 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 526-527 (2d ed. 1938) ; Nadelmann, supra note 26, at
159; Reese, supra note 22, at 784; Yntema, "The Enforcement of Foreign judgments in
Anglo-American Law," 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 passim (1935).
40 See note 80 infra.
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cases. They may be expected to multiply as the cases become at once
more frequent and more complex. 0
One of the first prerequisites for the needed reappraisal of this
subject matter is a terminology appropriate to the underlying policy
problems requiring clarification. In an article written in 1950, Profes-
sor Reese suggested that the doctrine of res judicata is the real policy
basis for decisions in this area, although the "usual reasoning of the
courts" and the "professed explanations" for recognition do not ordi-
narily penetrate that deeply.51 Reese did not pursue the point at
length, and he seems to have assumed that putting an end to litigation
is "the" policy basis of res judicata, whether applied to domestic or to
foreign judgments.52 But his suggestion at least resurrected 3 a con-
ceptual framework within which further inquiry could be pursued.
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of the res judicata concept in
its application to foreign judgments is that it seems to offer a rationale
for recognition and at the same time to provide built-in limitations on
the effect to be given. In this respect it is comparable to the amalgama-
tion of comity and enumerated defenses already considered. At least
in its traditional form the res judicata concept does not suffer from
the weakness of the comity and enumerated defenses amalgam, how-
ever, because it admits defenses at only one rather than at both ends
of the concept. It thus appears to provide a sharper tool for the
analysis of complex foreign judgment problems.
In order to be truly useful, however, a proposal for a res judicata
approach to this subject must go beyond a mere preference for clean-
cut terminology. If Reese is correct in suggesting that the res judicata
doctrine is the "real basis" for decisions which recognize or enforce
foreign judgments, then it follows that stripping that doctrine of the
overburden of such confusing concepts as comity is not likely to pro-
duce much change in case results. More specifically, if the res judicata
doctrine is conceived as resting on the single policy basis that there
should be an end to litigation, and if that policy is already controlling
case decision, then the explicit recognition of a res judicata approach
does not do much more than tidy up the legal language.
50 In addition to the increasing number of contacts which individuals make with
foreign countries, it should be noted that greater mobility of persons, both natural and
corporate, may result in litigation in more than two forums. See, e.g., Bata v. Bata, 163
A.2d 493 (Del. 1960) (Delaware, New York, Netherlands, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia);
Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (England,
Greece, New York).
51 Reese, supra note 22, at 784-85.
52 Ibid.
53 Recognition of the role of res judicata in the foreign judgments field is by no
means new. See Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109 (1821). Piggott suggested the
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The first serious effort to carry the res judicata concept beyond a
change in terminology appeared in an article by Professor Smit in
1962.11 Recognizing that the American cases "evidence a clear judicial
inclination to follow preconceived rules rather than to evaluate perti-
nent policy,"5' Smit suggests that the application of the res judicata
concept to foreign country judgments requires the recognition of new
policies which may be quite different from those underlying the tradi-
tional doctrine in its domestic context.56 This perceptive observation
must certainly be regarded as a signal contribution to the literature in
this field.
The balance of Professor Smit's stimulating article is devoted to
the most comprehensive attempt made thus far to isolate and identify,
in terms of the res judicata concept, the policies relevant to the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments. Justice cannot be done here to his persuasive
arguments, but some attention must be given to his major premise.
Noting the great differences between American law and foreign sub-
stantive and procedural law, as well as the different social, economic
and political matrices in which judicial machinery must function, he
establishes the major policy premise that the fairness of holding foreign
judgments binding at all is "generally attenuated."5 7 Similar considera-
tions ". . . would seem to aggravate the general weakness of the policy
underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel so seriously as to prohibit
application of that doctrine in its traditional form to foreign country
judgments."'' 8 Tracing out the consequences of these general proposi-
tions in terms of factual problems and lesser policy considerations, he
proposes for adoption in this field a number of extremely restrictive
rules. Thus conclusive effect of the sort now usually accorded would be
given only to judgments involving status or the in-rem-quasi-in-rem
determination of interests in property. 9 Foreign in personam judg-
ments would be given no binding effect at all if rendered against non-
domiciliaries of the judgment forum."0 Smit also concludes that
estoppel effect should normally be given only to status matters or to
the in-rem-quasi-in-rem determination of interests in property.6 An
exception would be made to allow collateral estoppel effect if the whole
re-evaluation of the foreign judgments problem in the light of a combination of res judi-
cata and comity doctrines over half a century ago. Piggott, op. cit. supra note 46.
G4 Smit, "International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,"
9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44 (1962).
55 Ibid.
56 Id. at 61-74.
57 Id. at 62, 64, 67 n.143.
58 Id. at 62.
59 Id. at 64-67.
60 Id. at 68.
61 Id. at 69-71.
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of a former in personam judgment (as opposed to a specific issue ad-
judicated therein) is drawn into question in the later collateral pro-
ceeding. 2
These conclusions will obviously not be encouraging to the pro-
ponents of greater conclusiveness for foreign judgments. Yet most of
these restrictions follow logically enough once one grants Smit's premise
that the rationale of the res judicata doctrine is necessarily weakened
by its projection into the field of foreign judgments. In the present
view that premise must be rejected, at least temporarily. The balance
of the present article will be devoted to the development of a slightly
different angle of attack on the problem of res judicata and foreign
country judgments. In the process of doing so it is believed that the
vulnerability of Smit's premise will be exposed, and that his restrictive
conclusions can thereby be demonstrated to be premature, if not al-
together unwarranted.
THE SCOPE OF THE REs JUDICATA RATIONALE
It has already been observed that the combination of the comity
concept with the enumeration of specific defenses produced unsatis-
factory theory because it rendered uncertain the defenses which could
be made to recognition of foreign judgments. 3 In view of this ex-
perience perhaps the first inquiry which must be made with respect to
any new approach is to ask whether it suffers from the same weakness.
On the purely' domestic, intrastate level, the res judicata doctrine
is a relatively unified concept. Even here, of course, it may be urged
that the rationale of the doctrine rests on policy grounds other than the
mere termination of litigation. Thus the convenience of the courts is
a factor for consideration. The policy of ending litigation seems itself
to proceed not merely from the policy of avoiding harassment of the
previously successful party, but also from the interest of the society in
reducing the degree of uncertainty in legal relationships between its
members. But on the whole it seems safe to describe the domestic
rationale of res judicata as the policy of ending litigation, even if that
policy may be understood as comprehending possible subclasses of
policy factors.
When the res judicata doctrine is projected to the level of sister-
state judgments, a number of policies emerge which are unknown to the
purely domestic concept. Most of these follow from the regulation of
enforcement and recognition as a matter of constitutional law.64 Res
62 Id. at 71-74.
63 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
64 See generally Jackson, Full Faith and Credit, The Lawyer's Clause of the Con-
stitution (1945).
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judicata and the full faith and credit requirement never have been and
never can be identical concepts, for the obvious reason that res judicata
has a domestic kingdom to rule which the full faith and credit require-
ment cannot enter. But when res judicata was lifted out of that do-
mestic context and applied to sister-state judgments, it is apparent that
it tended to merge with the full faith and credit concept both in the
language and the reasoning of the American courts."5 This followed
naturally enough from the early interpretation of the full faith and
credit clause, which almost from the outset was regarded as relating
to the conclusiveness of judgments. 6 Since the clause was understood
as putting a properly proved sister-state judgment upon the same foot-
ing as a domestic judgment,6 7 the res judicata theory applicable to
domestic judgments was logically extended to apply to those of sister
states. The virtual coalescence of the two concepts is most clearly seen
in those instances where a state court has been found not required to
give full faith and credit, but where it has decided to recognize the
sister-state adjudication anyway. In such cases recognition has usually
been given on a theory of comity, rather than on the res judicata basis
one might have expected if these concepts were still distinct.6
It was also recognized at a very early date that a prime purpose
of the constitutional provision was the ordering of legal relations be-
tween the sister states of a federal union.69 This ordering principle, in
03 See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943) ; Treinies v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 303 U.S. 66, 74-78 (1939); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-26 (1931).
60 Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
481 (1813) ; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 10 Am. Dec. 151 (1822) ; Pritchett v. Clark,
1 Del. (3 Harr.) 517 (Super. Ct. 1842); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 461 (1813).
67 Bimeler v. Dawson, 10 Ill. (4 Scam.) 536, 39 Am. Dec. 430 (1843); McKim v.
Odom, 12 Me. 94 (1835); Boston India Rubber Factory v. Hoit, 14 Vt. 92 (1842). These
early cases seemed to suggest that if a res judicata doctrine was applicable, it was that
of the recognition forum. In this respect the language of the Act of 1790 implementing
the full faith and credit clause (now 28 U.S.C. § 1738) was at first ignored, since it
called for faith and credit to judgments of sister states equal to the effect they had in the
place ". .. from which they are taken." This dearly means that the res judicata prin-
ciples to be applied are those of the judgment forum. See Thurber v. Blackbourne, 1 N.H.
242 (1818). But cf. Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 603 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882). The matter is
now well-settled as resting on judgment forum law rather than that of the recognition
forum, but it should be noted that the full faith and credit clause is not interpreted as
requiring the court of the recognition forum to take judicial notice of the res judicata
effect which would be produced by the law of the judgment forum. Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co., supra note 65. If the sister-state law of res judicata is not proved, therefore,
the court of the recognition forum would be justified in presuming that law to be the
same as its own.
68 See Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 167-168 (1962).
69 See, e.g., Williams v. Preston, 25 Ky. (3 JJ. Marsh.) 600, 20 Am. Dec. 179 (1830).
Cf. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 84 (1795).
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its various aspects, has unquestionably influenced case decision. The
most obvious examples of such influence are to be seen in those Su-
preme Court cases holding that full faith and credit must be given to
sister-state judgments (1) notwithstanding a strong public policy of
the recognition forum against the cause of action underlying the judg-
ment,70 (2) notwithstanding the fact that the judgment was founded
upon a revenue law of the sister state," and (3) notwithstanding a
clear mistake made by the sister-state court, even if that mistake is
apparent on the face of the record,72 and even if it was a mistake about
the law of the recognition forum.73 In the lower courts the defenses
raised were apparently regarded as sufficient to override the policy of
terminating litigation, as indeed they may have been on the sets of
facts presented by these cases. 4 But the lower courts failed to consider
that this policy is buttressed, in the sister-state cases, by the strong
policy of the ordering principle.
Whether or not there are other policies which appear in relation to
sister-state judgments need not now be considered because, for present
purposes, the point to be made is already established. This is simply
that when the res judicata doctrine is lifted out of its domestic habitat
and applied to sister-state judgments, its rationale becomes more com-
plex. Whether the composite concept thus produced is called res
judicata or full faith and credit is not important. What is significant is
that the rationale for enforcement and recognition of nondomestic
judgments has become a bundle of complementary policies.
The implications of this lesson for res judicata, if that doctrine is
to be projected beyond sister-state to foreign-country judgments, are
not altogether obvious. One thing is clear: we ought not to assume
without examination that the new policy factors which appeared at
the sister-state level automatically carry over into this broader con-
text. A few courts seem to have made this assumption, at least im-
plicitly, by applying full faith and credit rules to foreign judgments.7
The error of their ways has not passed unnoticed or uncriticized. 76
70 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
71 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
72 Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
73 Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra note 70.
74 The Milwaukee County case was an action brought in the federal district court in
Illinois; the original case was apparently not reported, but conformance with the Supreme
Court opinion appears in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 81 F.2d 753 (7th Cir.
1936). The Lurn case arose in Mississippi and apparently was unreported. The Myer
case arose in Colorado as a suit to void a Wyoming judgment. Myer v. Milliken, 101
Colo. 564, 76 P.2d 420 (1938), subsequent opinion, 105 Colo. 522, 100 P.2d 151 (1940).
75 See, e.g., Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., supra note 50.
76 Smit, supra note 54, at 46.
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On the other hand, neither can we assume without examination
that the policies at the sister-state level have no validity when the
doctrine is applied to foreign-country judgments. A number of Ameri-
can courts have grown fond of prefacing their remarks on the effect of
foreign judgments by saying: The full faith and credit clause is inap-
plicable to foreign-country judgments. 7 Taken at its face value, that
statement is irreproachable. But if it is meant to suggest that the policies
of the full faith and credit clause have no application to foreign judg-
ments because the clause itself has no such application, then one must
ask for further explanation. It is certainly no answer to say that the
absence of an international constitutional structure eliminates the
reasons for the recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments. 78 If a
policy basis for such recognition and enforcement exists, independent of
any constitutional considerations, then this argument is revealed as
standing on the strange assumption that constitutional provisions pro-
duce policies instead of being produced by them.
Turning to a consideration of the new policy factors which may
enter into the res judicata rationale at the foreign judgments level, it is
apparent that a strong case can be made for some policy of ordering
relations between countries. Some such ordering principle seems to be
the dominant policy underlying the comity doctrine, however clumsily
it has been expressed through that doctrine.79 In this respect it must be
observed that the ordering principle operates in two different ways, and
that part of the inexactitude of the comity concept may be attributable
to the failure to make this distinction.
First, the ordering principle may be conceived as a sort of loose-
jointed substitute for an effectively binding system of international law.
According to this conception, the ordering of relations results from the
pulling and hauling of separate legal systems toward the objective of
mutual tolerance. From the policy standpoint it may be urged that
such tolerance is desirable because it reduces friction between national
entities, promotes commerce and contact between them, and ultimately
serves the objective of international peace by making nations at once
more interdependent and less distrustful of one another. The danger of
implementation of this policy is that it may be thought to invite deci-
sion of particular cases on the basis of political bias rather than on the
merits. Closer examination suggests that the real danger here lies in
77 See, e.g., Perdikouris v. The S.S. Olympos, 185 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1960);
Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945).
78 But see Smit, supra note 54, at 45-6.
79 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-166 (1895); Draper's Ex'rs v. Gorman,
35 Va. (8 Leigh) 628, 637 (1837). Cf. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S.
485, 488-89 (1900) (discussing function of comity within the federal system).
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the method of implementation rather than in the policy itself. Thus the
reciprocity requirement, used as a theory of retorsion to coerce accept-
ance of American judgments by denying effect to judgments of coun-
tries which do not recognize American judgments, is plainly open to the
political bias criticisms ° But such a retorsion theory is simply a
defective method of implementing the ordering principle; instead of
effectively serving this policy, it may in fact be destructive of it. A
general presumption in favor of the enforcement and recognition of
foreign judgments, on the other hand, serves this policy of order free
of any such defect.
A second conception of the ordering principle turns the emphasis
away from the relations of nations and back to the relations of the
litigant parties. This can best be seen in its negative aspect. A flat
refusal to recognize the effect of foreign adjudication does not order
the legal relationships of the litigants, but on the contrary tends to
confuse these by producing conflicting duties or contradictory rela-
tions as between the two or more legal systems with which each of
these individuals has contact. The promotion of uniformity, whether
in terms of status or rights or duties, is the policy taproot of most
choice of law rules in the conflict of laws scheme."- That policy would
seem to be intensified in its application to the foreign judgments prob-
lem, because in the latter area the legal relations of the individual have
become in some degree fixed by the foreign adjudication. Adherence to
the standard set by the foreign.judgment will promote this uniformity
just as ignoring the foreign judgment will tend to destroy it. Enforce-
ment and recognition can therefore serve an ordering principle with
respect to individuals, by providing a rational process for sorting out
their private legal relations when they are caught in a snarl of litigation
in two different legal systems.
Still another important policy which must be considered as falling
within the scope of the res judicata rationale is the policy in favor of
the finality of American adjudications which may later be drawn into
question in a foreign court."2 It has already been noted that retorsion,
as exemplified by the reciprocity requirement, is an unwise method of
trying to achieve this result. But the policy in favor of finality for
8o See the dissenting opinion of Fuller, C.J., in Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 79, at
234. See also Reese, "The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad," 50
Colum. L. Rev. 783, 790-93 (1950).
81 Griswold, "In Reply to Mr. Cowan's Views on Renvoi," 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 257,
261 (1939). Cf. Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., supra note 50, at 474-5, 116 N.Y.S.2d
at 647.
82 See Nadelmann, "Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and
What To Do About It," 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236 (1957).
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American judgments must be accounted for, and this policy is some-
what different from the ordering principle already discussed. It looks
neither to the relations of states nor to the relations of the particular
parties now litigants. It aims rather at preserving the interests of future
litigants in American courts who may find it necessary to export their
judgments for enforcement or recognition. In short, the reciprocity
requirement has been pretty well discredited in the United States, but
it remains as one of the facts of life of foreign legal systems.8 3 Any
rule which tends to restrict the conclusive effect of foreign adjudication
in American courts therefore tends to diminish the chances for recogni-
tion of American judgments in foreign courts. At least if we under-
stand them and make them understood, 4 rules which favor the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments will promote increased finality for American
judgments abroad.8 5
Several conclusions may be drawn at this point. First, it is ap-
parent that new policy factors appear when the res judicata doctrine is
lifted from its domestic context and applied to nondomestic judgments.
If we truly wish to account for these factors in a policy-oriented ap-
proach to the problem of foreign-country judgments, however, we must
be prepared to account for those policies which strengthen the res
judicata rationale as well as for those which weaken it. Two such
strengthening factors have been described as the ordering principle and
the policy of finality for American judgments raised abroad. These
policies complement the policy of ending litigation, which may still be
regarded as the basic ingredient of the res judicata rationale.
83 See Gutteridge, "Reciprocity in Regard to Foreign Judgments," 13 Brit. Yb.
Int'l L. 49 (1932); Lenhoff, "Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea," 49
Nw. U.L. Rev. 619, 752 (1954); Lorenzen, "The Enforcement of American Judgments
Abroad," 29 Yale LJ. 188, 268 (1919); Mowitz, "The Execution of Foreign Judgments
in Germany," 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 795 (1933); Nadelmann, "Reprisals Against American
Judgments?," 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1184 (1952). For a current picture of the requirements
of various countries see Buelow-Arnold, Internationaler Rechtsverkehr (Supp. to 1960).
84 See Feller, "Die Vollstreckbarkeit von Urteilen amerikanischer Gerichte in
Deutschland," 60 Juristische Wochenschrift 112 (1931). Feller's principal thesis is that
the refusal of the German Reicbsgericht to enforce a California judgment (RG 70, 434)
was not justified, and was largely a result of misunderstanding of California law.
85 It is probable that part of the lack of understanding by other countries of the
very liberal view taken by most American courts toward foreign judgments has resulted
from the lack of any completely comprehensive compilation of the American law. Even
such complete works as that of Buelow-Arnold states merely that the situation in the
United States must be determined from an examination of the law of each particular
state. Buelow-Arnold, op. cit. supra note 83, at 991-97. Since the precedents in many
states are out of date and thus not in accord with modem American notions of jurisdic-
tion, the possibility of uniform state legislation is particularly appealing. See Nadelmann,
"The United States of America and Agreements on Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments," 1 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 156, 170-72 (1953).
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Second, it must be conceded that the internal consistency of res
judicata theory may be disturbed by its acquisition of this complex
rationale. This was essentially the problem of the comity concept, and
the nature of the problem is not altered by giving it a new name. If all
of the relevant policies in this area are to be accounted for, as they must
be under any approach which pretends to be policy-oriented, then it
must also be recognized that the defenses to recognition and enforce-
ment undergo a similar tendency toward complexity. Res judicata pro-
jected to the foreign judgment level must therefore be treated as a
composite concept containing both a complex policy rationale and a
complex of policy defenses.
To the extent that the weakness of the comity doctrine is attrib-
utable to the failure to articulate relevant policy considerations,
there is some value in a reappraisal which does no more than expose
some of these policies. If the res judicata approach is to be offered as
a substitute for comity, however, it must somehow deal more effectively
with the relationship between its complex rationale and the possible
defenses.
THE NATURE OF THE ENUMERATED DEFENSES
The first step which must be taken in order to bring the defenses
into some logically manageable form is simply to recognize that all
possible objections to the recognition of foreign judgments are defenses.
Stated in this fashion the proposition seems almost tautological, but it
has been far from obvious in the development of the case law under the
comity doctrine. The tendency of comity to let defenses in by the back
door has already been noted."' This practice probably helped to conceal
the complex nature of the rationale for recognition and clearly dis-
couraged close analysis of the traditional defenses.
If this approach is taken, then a catalog of the defenses which
have been used to defeat the effect of foreign judgments will include:
(1) insufficient authentication or proof of the foreign judgment; 87 (2)
86 See cases cited note 14 supra. It may well be that res judicata analysis is not
wholly free from the same danger. Consider the following statement: "Thus, the desire
to deal justly with individual litigants is increasingly realized not to be a policy com-
peting-or even conflicting-with the rationale of the doctrine of res judicata." Smit,
supra note 54, at 59.
87 See, e.g., Boehmer v. Heinen, 138 Neb. 376, 293 N.W. 237 (1940); Vandervoot v.
Smith, 2 Cal. R. 154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 Pac. 83
(1926). Authentication must be according to local statutory requirements, but the seal
of the foreign court is probably not alone sufficient. Delafield v. Hand, 3 Johns. R. 310
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808). But see Chew v. Keck, 4 Rawle 162 (Pa. 1833). A judgment may
be proved by parol evidence, however, if it is shown that the original record is lost,
Trevino v. Fernandez, 13 Tex. 630 (1855), or destroyed, Estate of Gonzalez, 6 Misc. 2d
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lack of finality of the foreign judgment;88 (3) lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction; 9 (4) lack of personal jurisdiction; 9 0 (5) insufficiency of
notice or opportunity to be heard; 9' (6) procurement of the foreign
judgment by extrinsic fraud; 92 (7) clear mistake of fact or law made
by the foreign court in rendering the judgment; 93 and (8) the foreign
judgment contravenes the public policy of the recognition forum. The
public policy defense is subject to further subdivision, of which four
principal subtypes may be noted: (a) the reciprocity requirement; 9 4
118, 156 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Surr. Ct. 1956). Unless it is clear under the local statute that this
is unnecessary, it is wise to have a translation of the foreign judgment itself authenticated,
Martens v. Martens, 284 N.Y. 363, 31 N.E.2d 489 (1940).
88 Boissevain v. Boissevain, 252 N.Y. 178, 169 N.E. 130 (1929); Munn v. Cook, 55
Hun. 603, 8 N.Y. Supp. 698 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Dulles v. Dulles, 369 Pa. 101, 85 A.2d 134
(1952); Burnside v. Burnside, 2 Dauph. 261 (Pa. County Ct. 1899); In re Pearson's
Estate, 6 Pa. County Ct. 298 (1889) ; Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 R.I. 268, 160 Atl. 205
(1932) ; Cooke v. Cooke, supra note 87.
89 In re Gillies' Estate, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951), Romanchick v. Howard Say.
Institute, 118 N.J.L. 606, 194 Atl. 185 (E. & A. 1937) ; In re Lockwood's Will, 147 N.Y.S.2d
106 (Surt. Ct. 1955); Hansen v. Hansen, 255 App. Div. 1016, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1938);
McEwen v. McEwen, 50 N. D. 662, 197 N.W. 862 (1924) ; San Lorenzo Title Improvement
Co. v. City Mortgage Co., 124 Tex. 25, 73 S.W.2d 513 (1934).
90 Thorn v. Salmonson, 37 Kan. 441, 15 Pac. 588 (1887); Kerr, Brown & Co. v.
Condy, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 372 (1872) ; Succession of Lorenz, 41 La. Ann. 1091, 6 So. 886
(1889) ; Wilson v. Gibson, 214 Mo. App. 219, 259 S.W. 491 (1924) ; Rhodesian Gen. Fin.
& Trading Trust Co. v. MacQuisten, 170 Misc. 996, 11 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, 226 App. Div. 56, 234 N.Y. Supp. 202
(1929); Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis. 2i5, 31 N.W. 477 (1887).
91 See The Maria, 20 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Va. 1936); McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Mich.
765, 31 Am. Rep. 332 (1878); In re Deckert's Will, 141 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Surr. Ct. 1955);
In re Paramythiotis' Estate, 15 Misc. 2d 133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Surr. Ct. 1958); China
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Force, 142 N.Y. 90, 36 N.E. 874 (1894); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106
Ten. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915). But see Quintana v. Quintana, 101 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Sup.
Ct. 1950).
92 Weil v. Poulsen, 121 Conn. 281, 184 Atl. 580 (1936); Stewart v. Warner, 1 Day.
142, 2 Am. Dec. 61 (Conn. 1803) ; Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1948) ;
Tremblay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509 (1903), writ of error dismissed,
223 U.S. 185 (1912); In re Topcuoglu's Will, 11 Misc. 2d 859, 174 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Surr.
Ct. 1958) ; Goldstein v. Goldstein, 166 N.Y. Supp. 1074 (Sup. Ct. 1917) ; May v. Roberts,
133 Ore. 643, 286 Pac. 546 (1930).
93 See statutes cited note 34 supra. It was not uncommon for the earlier cases to
refer to the defense of mistake in dicta, e.g., Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 82 Am. Dec.
404 (1862). But references to mistake as a defense are generally omitted from the later
cases, apparently on the theory that if a mistake was committed, this was a matter
which the injured party could and should correct by appeal or other reference to the
courts of the judgment forum. See Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893).
94 Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 79; Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, Ltd., 33 F.2d
667 (1st Cir. 1929); Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 At]. 714 (1895);
Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 At. 715 (1929). Cf. Gull v. Constam,
105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952).
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(b) the foreign judgment was rendered under laws of purely local
applicability, including penal or quasi-criminal laws; 95 (c) the foreign
judgment was rendered upon.a cause of action unknown or outlawed
in the recognition forum; 96 and (d) the foreign judgment was rendered
under foreign law deemed by the recognition forum to be grossly
unfair?
In one sense all of the enumerated defenses pose the question
whether the rationale for recognition is stronger than the reasons for
nonrecognition. To this extent all of the defenses may be considered as
raising policies in competition with the policy underlying the rationale
for recognition. If analysis is left at this level, however, there is little
basis for understanding either the nature of the defenses or their
relative strength.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the defenses may be classified by
their relationship to the res judicata rationale. If this is done, some
of the defenses will be seen to stand on policy which is wholly distinct
from the rationale and truly in competition with it. For the sake of
simplicity, these may be called the independent defenses. A second
group consists of defenses whose nature is just the converse, that is,
their validity depends not on distinct policy considerations but upon
weakening the recognition rationale. These may be called the de-
pendent defenses. A third category, partaking in varying measure of
the features of both the other groups, may be called the mixed defenses.
The clearest examples of the indepehdent defenses are lack of
jurisdiction and insufficiency of notice or opportunity to be heard. The
defenses based on gross unfairness of the foreign law and on failure of
authentication or proof of the foreign judgment belong to this category
as well. The independent policy on which each of these defenses stands
is the requirement of a basic minimum of fairness to the individual
litigant against whose interest the foreign judgment is offered, although
that policy is susceptible of subdivision into somewhat more concrete
terms for each of the defenses.
The extended treatment which each defense deserves cannot be un-
dertaken here, but at least a few basic observations must be offered with
95 In re Neidnig's Estate, 123 App. Div. 894, 108 N.Y. Supp. 478 (1908); Kordoski
v. Belanger, supra note 88. See also Weil v. Weil, 26 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941),
in which a Danish divorce decree was questioned after remarriage of plaintiff-wife in
Michigan. The New York court suggested that a successful attack on the decree might
have been made by showing that the Danish decree was void either under New York
or under Michigan law. But see Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1958).
96 De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309 (No. 3715) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873).
97 Banco Minero v. Ross, supra note 91.
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respect to the especially important defense of lack of jurisdiction. The
unfortunate tendency of American courts to express a great variety of
notions of fairness in terms of jurisdictional principles, both in domestic
internal law and in conflict of law rules, greatly complicates analysis.98
Whether or not the foreign court had jurisdiction must ultimately be
tested by the notions of fairness held by the court of the recognition
forum, 9 although some attention may be paid to whether or not the
foreign court acquired jurisdiction according to its own law. 10° Since a
determination of fairness in this jurisdictional usage depends largely on
finding some rational connection between the forum and the persons or
subject matter involved in the litigation, the court to which a judgment
is presented for recognition is likely to look to its own rules for acquir-
ing jurisdiction to determine whether the connection with the foreign
court was rational.' 01
The extraordinary strength of the independent defenses, which al-
most always prevail if facts to support them can be established, is well
9 See Smit, "The Terms Jurisdiction and Competence in Comparative Law," 10
Am. J. Comp. L. 164 (1961); Nussbaum, "Jurisdiction and Foreign judgments," 41
Colum. L. Rev. 221 (1941).
99 See cases cited note 90 supra. This is one of the areas in which the projection of
full faith and credit notions to the foreign level creates confusion. At least on the national
level the United States Supreme Court can act as an arbiter of what will or will not
suffice for either subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, and it may choose
to exercise this power in light of the "ordering" aspect of full faith and credit. Cf.
Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938). The absence of any such arbiter for foreign
judgment cases is obviously a potential source of great variation between states' laws on
this subject. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912). It is, of course,
possible that the Supreme Court may assume the role of arbiter through the due process
clause rather than the full faith and credit clause. The Court has indicated in dictum
that recognition of a foreign judgment on either a full faith and credit or a comity theory
would be a violation of due process if the foreign court lacked jurisdiction. Griffin v.
Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946).
100 Earlier cases not infrequently suggested that it would be a defense to recognition
or enforcement to show that the judgment had been "irregularly obtained." See, e.g.,
Aldrich v. Kinney, supra note 66; Draper's Ex'rs v. Gorman, supra note 79. Cf. Lazier
v. Westcott, supra note 83. But see Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781. Subject
only to the dictates of the due process clause, the requirement in the case of sister-state
judgments is that the jurisdiction of the judgment forum shall be tested by its own
rules for acquiring jurisdiction, not by the rules of the recognition forum. Adams v.
Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). This may be an area where the absence of any international
constitutional structure calls for a different result on the international level. See Smit,
supra note 54. See also Reese, supra note 80, at 789-90. Cf. Caruso v. Caruso, 106 N.J.
Eq. 130, 148 AtI. 882 (E. & A. 1930). But cf. Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. 2d 249, 254, 331
P.2d 641, 644 (1958) (concurring opinion by Justice Traynor); Palmarito de Cauto
Sugar Co. v. Warner, 225 App. Div. 261, 232 N.Y. Supp. 569 (1929); Oettgen v. Oettgen,
196 Misc. 937, 94 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
101 See Reese, supra note 80, at 789-90 and cases cited therein.
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illustrated by the defense of lack of jurisdiction in the foreign court.
Although the American courts are perfectly willing to concede that
mere differences of the foreign law from our law should not prevent
recognition of foreign judgments,"0 2 still they rather consistently have
indulged in the presumption that our methods of acquiring jurisdiction
are the only rational ones, and that foreign judgments rendered in
reliance upon different methods should not be enforced.11 3 This has led
to some interesting and incongruous results. At least before the Ameri-
can courts generally recognized the domicile of the defendant in the
forum as a rational basis for acquiring personal jurisdiction over him
by service of process made outside the forum, a foreign judgment in
personam rendered on the basis of jurisdiction acquired in this fashion
would not be recognized."0 4 A shift in American opinion as to the
reasonableness of this method'0 5 was followed by the enforcement of
foreign judgments based on that method.'0 6 Consent to the jurisdiction
of the foreign court has generally been regarded as a rational connec-
tion,1 7 but casual contacts such as the making of a contract in the
foreign country have not been regarded as a rational basis for extra-
territorial service of process.'08 It will be interesting to see if the pres-
102 Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Tex. 1941), af'd, 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1943); Baker v. Palmer, 83 111. 568 (1876);
Caruso v. Caruso, supra note 100.
103 Compagnie Du Port De Rio De Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d
163 (S.D. Me. 1927); Henderson v. Drake, 138 Cal. App. 2d 671, 292 P.2d 254 (1956);
Traders' Trust Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N.W. 735 (1920); Skandinaviska
Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, supra note 90.
104 See cases cited note 103 supra. But see Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273, 5 Am.
Dec. 105 (1811).
105 The stamp of approval was finally put upon this method of service by the
Supreme Court in 1940, Milliken v. Myer, supra note 72. But acceptance of this pro-
cedure had long preceded the Milliken case in some states. See, e.g., In re Hendrickson,
40 S.D. 211, 167 N.W. 172 (1918). Cf. Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181, 10 AUt. 556
(1887).
10 See, e.g., Rhodesian Gen. Fin. & Trading Trust Ltd. v. MacQuisten, supra
note 90.
lo Regierungspraesident Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Rosenthal, 17 App. Div.
145, 232 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1962); Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
But cf. Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940); In re Davis' Will,
31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Surr. Ct. 1961). Personal service within the foreign
country, even if it occurred during a temporary stay, has been held sufficient on the
theory that entering the country is a consent to jurisdiction of the courts there in the
sense that the foreigner owes a temporary allegiance to the tribunals of the country he
enters. See Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, supra note 94.
108 "It is to be noted . . . that the mere transaction of business in a State by a
non-resident natural person does not imply consent to be bound by the process of the
courts." Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, supra note 90, at 59, 234 N.Y.
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ently changing attitudes in the United States toward the reasonable-
ness of such a basis for out-of-state service 9 will be reflected in future
treatment of foreign judgments rendered on such a basis. In approach-
ing this problem, the American courts would do well to consider the
policies underlying their own choice of law rules. If the case is one in
which the recognition forum's choice of law rule would refer to the
substantive law of country X for the rules of decision as to the under-
lying cause of action, it seems a bit incongruous for the recognition forum
to deny that a rational connection existed between country X and the
underlying transaction, sufficient at least to justify personal service on
the defendant outside of X.
Turning now to the dependent defenses, it is apparent that some
preliminary assessments must be made. Since these defenses derive
their validity solely from the weakness of the rationale for recognition,
new account must be taken of the complex nature of the res judicata
rationale. As a working hypothesis it is suggested that a defense of this
kind, in order to prevail, must destroy all parts of the recognition
rationale which could stand alone. This requires, of course, an assess-
ment of the self-sufficiency of each of the policies considered as com-
prising the res judicata rationale. Clearly the policy of ending litiga-
tion is self-sufficient, in the sense of constituting sufficient reason in
itself for recognition. Beyond this, measurement becomes difficult. The
writer is inclined to regard the so-called ordering principle as self-
sufficient also, but for the present it may be well to proceed more
cautiously. The assumption will be made, therefore, that only the
policy for terminating litigation can stand alone and that all other
relevant policies merely buttress it.
Further problems of measurement can best be seen by considering
a specific example. The defense of lack of finality of the foreign judg-
ment seems to be a dependent defense because what it suggests is that no
foreign adjudication as yet exists."' It does not deny the existence of
Supp. at 207. Cf. Ross v. Ostrander, 192 Misc. 140, 79 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Kerr v. Tagliavia, 101 Misc. 614, 168 N.Y. Supp. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 186 App.
Div. 893, 172 N.Y. Supp. 901 (1918).
109 See, e.g., fli. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956). See also New
York Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961) (constitutional question
avoided by narrow interpretation of Alabama statute).
110 In re Cleland's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 18, 258 P.2d 1097 (1953). See also
cases cited note 88 supra. The defense of lack of finality bears an obviously close re-
semblance to the claim of lis pendens, as a plea in abatement. Domestic proceedings are
often stayed pending the completion of foreign proceedings as a matter of "comity"
and in the discretion of the trial court, but this may be refused if it appears that the
issues in the foreign proceedings are not identical with those in the domestic forum and
that the domestic forum is equally convenient. See Pesquera Del Pacifico S. De. R.L. v.
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foreign litigation, but merely asserts that no effect should be given to
the foreign proceedings because their result is uncertain. This rep-
resents a direct attack on the policy of ending litigation, since that
policy requires some definitive conclusion to litigation before it comes
into play. Similarly, this defense is capable of destroying the supple-
mentary policies of res judicata as well. It asserts that there is as yet
no right, duty or status for the ordering principle to order. It can even
turn the other facet of the ordering principle inside out, so as to suggest
that friction with the other legal system can best be avoided by taking
no action whatever in the present forum until a final foreign result is
achieved. In similar fashion it cuts the ground from under the policy
of finality for American judgments, by suggesting that American courts
would not want foreign courts to jump the gun on American judgments
by giving them effect before their results were final.
In this way all parts of the recognition rationale can be destroyed
by a dependent defense. Finality, however, is by no means a clear-cut
concept. If the foreign court has rendered a judgment or decree, and
the defense asserts merely that the foreign judgment is subject to
change by the foreign court, then an entirely different picture is pre-
sented. Insofar as the change which may be made in the foreign judg-
ment cannot be made retroactive, then all of the policies for recognition
remain fully applicable and the judgment should be recognized or en-
forced."' If the potential change can be made retroactive, then the
litigation-ending policy of res judicata is seriously weakened, but the
supplementary policies are virtually untouched." 2 Then the problem of
Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 2d 738, 201 P.2d 553 (1949). Cf. Oakland Truck Sales Inc.
v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 902 (Ct. CI. 1957). But see Grey v. Independent Order of
Foresters, 196 S.W. 779 (Mo. App. 1917).
111 Porges v. Louis-Dreyfus, 280 App. Div. 277, 113 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1952). The fi-
nality of a foreign temporary order of support, pending the conclusion of a matrimonial
action, has also been held to establish a maximum beyond which the recognition forum
should not order additional payment. Di Benedetto v. Di Benedetto, 284 App. Div.
982, 135 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1954).
112 Kordoski v. Belanger, supra note 88. One method of meeting this problem is
to permit the other party to appear and seek a modification in the recognition forum to
the same extent that change would be permitted in the judgment forum. See Herczog
v. Herczog, 186 Cal. App. 2d 318, 9 Cal. Rep. 5 (1960). Such an approach runs squarely
into the objection that the effect of the foreign judgment, if measured by the law of the
judgment forum, raises numerous problems of interpretation of foreign law. Smit, "In-
ternational Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States," 9 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 44, 63 (1962). Although the problems of proof of foreign law may indeed be
formidable, the present writer is inclined to believe that the matter can be handled
fairly by the development of presumptions as to the foreign law, always leaving it open
to any party to establish what that law actually provides. From a practical standpoint
it also seems unlikely that many American courts could be persuaded to measure the
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measurement of policy strength becomes crucial. A working hypothesis
here might be the following: If the policy of terminating litigation is
merely weakened and not destroyed, and if the other policies of the
res judicata rationale are unaffected, then the defense must fail.
Another example of the dependent defense is the reciprocity require-
ment, and under the analysis here proposed, its fatal weakness as a
defense is laid bare. The questionable effectiveness of the reciprocity
rule to serve either the policy of finality for American judgments or the
ordering principle has already been discussed." 3 As a defense, that is,
that the foreign judgment should not be recognized because the foreign
forum does not recognize American judgments, it therefore does no
more than weaken the supplementary policies of the res judicata ra-
tionale. Even if it be assumed that the supplementary policies are
wholly destroyed, the basic ingredient of res judicata remains un-
touched. Against the litigation-ending policy, the reciprocity defense
suggests only that litigation should not be ended because other policies
in favor of recognition have become inapplicable.
Still another defense in the dependent category is that which op-
poses recognition because the laws under which the foreign judgment
was rendered are deemed to be only locally applicable. This type of
defense has been criticized,".4 and its extreme weakness is especially
apparent when the law of the recognition forum makes similar pro-
vision for dealing with the same problem. Thus it is patently absurd
to refuse recognition to a foreign filiation order for lying-in expenses
and support of the illegitimate child when the recognition forum pro-
vides precisely the same remedies under its own bastardy statutes.15
Arguments that filiation proceedings are quasi-criminal are also not
persuasive, for, at least so long as the recognition forum has similar
provisions, none of the various policies for recognition are seriously
affected."'
effect of foreign judgments solely by recognition forum rules because of the persistent
danger that this would be to give the judgment greater effect than it would be entitled
to in the state of rendition. Smit avoids this difficulty, rather easily, by suggesting that
under the restrictive rules he proposes, the problem would rarely arise. Smit, supra at
63 n.126. It is to be hoped that the American courts will continue to prefer the illness to
such a rigorous cure. See In re Cleland's Estate, supra note 110.
113 See authorities cited notes 80, 83 supra.
114 Reese, supra note 80, at 797.
115 But cf. Kordoski v. Belanger, supra note 88. The Rhode Island court did not
even mention its own statute, R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-8-3 (1956), in effect in Rhode
Island since 1896. Instead it noted that there was no duty at common law to support an
illegitimate child, and although it recognized that this rule has been changed by statute
in most states, the court seems to have held that such changes in the common law are to
be given only local effect.
110 See Coveney v. Phiscator, 132 Mich. 258, 93 N.W. 619 (1903) (holding a col-
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A distinction should be carefully drawn between the "locally ef-
fective" judgments just considered and those which are founded on
causes of action unknown or outlawed in the recognition forum. Treat-
ment of the latter would seem to depend on whether or not the law of
the recognition forum expresses some active policy against the enforce-
ment of such a cause of action anywhere.17 If such a positive law
policy exists, then a defense based upon it would have to be classified
as independent and therefore strong. If the foreign proceeding is
simply one unknown to the forum, and if no positive policy against it
appears, then the defense would be dependent and weak." 8 If there is
a local policy against the foreign cause of action, but it is interpreted
as a policy of only local applicability, then the defense may also be
regarded as dependent and quite weak." 9 In that event the local policy
against the cause of action may simply be regarded as irrelevant. A
similar result may be reached, perhaps, even if the local policy is
relevant, on the theory that the cause of action is merged in the foreign
judgment 2 °
Before passing on to a consideration of the so-called mixed de-
fenses, it may be well to consider a feature of the proposed classifica-
tion scheme suggested by the examples last considered. With the single
exception of the failure of proof of the foreign judgment, which pre-
sents a rather special case, all of the independent defenses suggest that
the foreign judgment should never have been rendered at all. The
dependent defenses, on the other hand, do not deny the propriety of the
foreign proceedings. They suggest only that the foreign adjudication
lateral attack on a Canadian criminal conviction not permissible). But see In re Neidnig's
Estate, supra note 95 (declining to give collateral estoppel effect to a foreign filiation
proceeding).
117 No modern cases have been found in which American courts candidly stated
such an attitude. Perhaps this is the result of reluctance to sit in judgment on the foreign
law, but the distinction seems nonetheless useful. Reese suggests that the case of De
Brimont v. Penniman, supra note 96, falls in this category. Reese, supra note 80, at 797.
But the court in that case specifically held that the purpose of the French statute in
question was local, ". . . framed for the people of France, to regulate their domestic
concerns, protect the public, and guard against pauperism and its evils." 7 Fed. Cas. at
310-11.
118 But cf. De Brimont v. Penniman, supra note 96.
119 Neporany v. Kir, supra note 95.
120 Ibid. But cf. Oilcakes & Oilseeds Trading Co. v. Sinason Teicher Inter American
Grain Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 651, 170 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct. 1958), modified on other grounds,
7 App. Div. 2d 977, 183 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1959), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 852, 203 N.Y.S.2d 904,
168 N.E.2d 708 (1960). It seems generally to have been assumed that a foreign judgment
does not merge the underlying cause of action. Swift v. David, 181 Fed. 828 (9th Cir.
1910); New York, L.E. & W. Ry. Co. v. McHenry, 17 Fed. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). But see
Alaska Commercial Co. v. Debney, 2 Alaska 303 (1904).
[Vol. 24
FOREIGN COUNTRY JUDGMENTS
should not be given any extraterritorial effect. It seems more than
coincidental that the former defenses have been regarded as strong by
the American courts, while the latter have been viewed as relatively
weak. Perhaps another working hypothesis can be derived from this:
If a defense raised fails to attack the propriety of the foreign judgment
in its foreign setting, then the defense should enjoy no presumptions
of validity. This would not eliminate the use of such defenses alto-
gether, but would require that they be treated as more than mechanical
rules. In order to prevail, in other words, such a defense should be
required to clearly demonstrate that it destroys or renders inapplicable
the rationale for recognition.
The two remaining defenses, procurement by fraud and mistake
of law or fact, have been called the mixed defenses in the proposed
classification because they simultaneously stand on independent policy
and attack the rationale for recognition. Somewhat different consider-
ations apply to each.
Notwithstanding broader language in some of the cases,' 2' it
appears to be well-settled that only "extrinsic fraud" is a defense to a
foreign judgment.'22 Such fraud is that which, by its very nature, could
not have been passed upon by the foreign court. The classic example
is that of the plaintiff who obtains jurisdiction over the defendant and
then induces him not to defend by representing that the action is being
withdrawn, 12 3 or that it is merely a "friendly" suit.124 The defrauded
party is thereby denied his proper day in court, and a default judgment
taken by plaintiff can be collaterally attacked when plaintiff tries to en-
force it elsewhere.
The independent policy of fairness permitting such a defense to be
121 It is at least arguable that a very broad notion of fraud is contained in the de-
fense that the foreign judgment was "irregularly obtained." See authorities cited note 100
supra. A rather large number of cases have referred merely to the defense of "fraud"
without specifying the nature of the fraud. See, e.g., Roth v. Roth, 104 InI. 35, 44 Am.
Rep. 31 (1882), writ of error dismissed sub nom., Roth v. Ehman, 107 U.S. 319 (1832);
Thorn v. Salmonson, supra note 90; Dunstan v. Higgins, supra note 93.
122 The leading American (domestic law) case is United States v. Throckmorton,
93 U.S. 61 (1878). This rule has generally been followed in foreign judgment cases where
the issue is relevant. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 210, 228 (1895) ; Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 Pac. 542 (1915); Fisher,
Brown & Co. v. Fielding, supra note 94; Long v. Hammond, 40 Me. 204 (1855); Gold-
stein v. Goldstein, supra note 92. But see Stewart v. Warner, supra note 92; Ambler v.
Whipple, 139 Ill. 311, 28 N.E. 841 (1891).
123 See Goldstein v. Goldstein, supra note 92. A variation on this type of defense
occurs when plaintiff procures a power of attorney from defendant by fraud and uses
it to enter a personal appearance for defendant in the foreign action. See State v. De Meo,
20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1 (1955).
124 May v. Roberts, 133 Ore. 643, 286 Pac. 546 (1930).
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raised is clearly a strong one, having much in common with the defense
of inadequate notice or inadequate opportunity to be heard. It should
clearly prevail in any case where facts to support it can be established,
and, where the fraud practiced by the successful party is clearly ex-
trinsic, it might well be regarded simply as an independent defense.
It will be noted, however, that the defense of fraud as thus con-
ceived depends wholly upon establishing the extrinsic nature of the
fraud. The danger of hitching the validity of the defense to a definition
of "extrinsic" is that this is precisely the mechanical kind of conceptual-
ism which may depart in practice from underlying reason and policy.
Consider, for example, a foreign judgment rendered after litigation on
the merits. After its rendition the party against whom judgment was
rendered discovers that the successful party had suborned the perjury
of several witnesses who testified. May recognition or enforcement of
the judgment in another forum be prevented by showing this fact? If
the case is decided by reference solely to the definition of "extrinsic,"
it is quite likely that the defense will be denied. 5 The foreign court
passed upon the credibility of the witnesses. Indeed it may have re-
jected their testimony entirely and decided the case on wholly different
grounds.
It must be conceded on such facts that the independent policy in
favor of the defense of extrinsic fraud is seriously weakened, and that
the full force of the res judicata rationale might well outweigh it. The
real point at issue, however, is whether the res judicata rationale oper-
ates at full force. It seems safe to assume that a court of any civilized
country, confronted with a showing that such perjury had occurred,
should reopen its own judgment and should at least re-examine the
merits sufficiently to determine whether the perjured testimony had in-
fluenced the decision.' If this assumption is well-founded, then the
defense of fraud is still a strong one. It rests not only on the inde-
pendent policy of fairness, but strikes also at the res judicata rationale,
weakening that rationale in much the same way as the dependent de-
fense of lack of finality.
1 27
A similar argument can be advanced for the defense of mistake of
fact or law. It is clear, in other words, that such mistake may, but does
125 Cf. Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines Ltd., supra note 94. But cf. Tremblay v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 92.
128 Restatement, Judgments §§ 63, 121 (1942) Cf. Zivilprozessordnung § 580
(Germany 1950).
127 See text accompanying note 110 supra. Cf. Perkins v. Guaranty Trust Co., 274
N.Y. 250, 8 N.E.2d 849 (1937). See also Perkins v. De Witt, 197 Misc. 369, 94 N.Y.S.2d




not necessarily, strike at the basic propriety of the foreign judgment.
Its independent policy basis is therefore weaker than the typical inde-
pendent defense, and it must rely on a simultaneous attack on the res
judicata rationale. The problem here, however, is that it becomes im-
possible to presume that the foreign court would reopen its own judg-
ment in order to consider such a mistake, since the matter is presum-
ably one on which the foreign court has already passed. In the absence
of such a presumption, the supplementary policies of the recognition
rationale are not weakened and the force of the litigation-ending policy
is at best only slightly diminished. A working hypothesis formulated to
meet this problem might be: The defense of mistake of law or fact is
relatively weak unless the party raising it can establish that the mis-
take is of such nature that the court of the judgment forum would re-
open its own judgment on this ground.
Quite aside from these considerations, the mistake defense seems
to have fallen into disrepute in the American courts for fear that, if
allowed as a defense, the effect of any foreign judgment could be de-
feated simply by alleging that a mistake had been made. 28 The danger
thus foreseen is that the party objecting to consideration of the foreign
judgment would be permitted to go into the whole merits of the foreign
cause in order to prove the alleged mistake. This argument seems to be
only partly valid. It obviously has no application to mistakes which
are apparent on the face of the foreign record.'2 9 It certainly has less
validity with respect to mistake of law, particularly law of the recogni-
tion forum, than to mistake of fact."' The argument does point up a
matter relevant to all of the defenses, however. Under no circumstances
128 See Dunstan v. Higgins, supra note 93. See also Story, Conflict of Laws § 608,
at 830 (Bigelow 8th ed. 1883). But see Bank of China, Japan & The Straits v. Morse,
44 App. Div. 435, 61 N.Y. Supp. 268 (1899). This argument has much in common with
Story's criticism of the prima fade evidence rule that it ". . . would be a mere delusion,
if the defendant might still question it [the foreign judgment] by opening all or any of
the original merits on his side; for under such circumstances it would be equivalent to
granting a new trial." Story, supra at 829.
129 See Story, op. cit. supra note 128, at 829.
130 See Reese, "The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad," 50
Colum. L. Rev. 783, 785 (1950). Even if the mistake was as to the law of the recognition
forum, however, if the party now urging the mistake had the opportunity to prove that
law in the judgment forum and chose not to do so, the foreign judgment cannot be im-
peached on the ground of mistake. MacDonald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 71 N.H. 448,
52 At. 982 (1902). The defense is obviously very weak if the alleged mistake was as to
the law of the judgment forum. Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Comm. App.
1933). A mistake as to the law of a third country would seem to be a rather weak de-
fense in any case where the party complaining of the mistake had an opportunity to
prove the foreign law to the (other) foreign court. But cf. Bata v. Hill, 139 A.2d 159,
182 (Del. Ch. 1958), aff'd sub. nom., Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493 (Del. 1960).
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should the mere allegation of a defense permit a complete re-examina-
tion of the merits on the pretense that this is merely proof of the de-
fense. 131 It would seem desirable to provide for some form of prelimi-
nary hearing on such defenses, in which the taking of evidence is re-
stricted to matters relevant to the validity of the defense.'32
CONCLUSION
The effect of judgments, both sister-state and foreign, has achieved
somewhat greater stability than many of its companion subjects in the
conflict of laws. Some of the arguments made herein have suggested
that this stability has been achieved by the development of more or less
mechanical rules. The approach here proposed might well reduce to
some degree the certainty and predictability of results in this field, but
this is a price which must almost inevitably be paid if a subject is to be
developed along policy lines. In a complicated policy area like that of
foreign judgments, it seems doubtful if any fixed set of Xules can imple-
ment underlying policy except with the grossest sort of approximation.
The alternative suggested here is that rules, as such, should be con-
structed only for the clearest aspects of the problem. Beyond that,
actual decision of cases should employ mere working hypotheses amount-
ing to little more than presumptions. This approach would invite recog-
nition and articulation of new policy arguments at every point of con-
flict and uncertainty.
The approach taken here frankly and unashamedly favors the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, not from any pre-
conception that this should be done, but because the policies in favor of
that result seem to the writer to be very potent. This view seems to be
well-supported by most of the American cases, although the policies in
question have been more often felt than expressed. It seems to the
writer that these policies are best served by requiring defenses to
establish themselves on a case-to-case basis, either by showing an inde-
pendent and overriding policy or by showing that on the particular facts
the rationale for recognition does not apply.
Use of the res judicata concept as a framework for this approach
must be regarded as an advance toward the articulation of underlying
policy, both for and against recognition. Because of the relatively uni-
fied nature of the res judicata doctrine at the domestic level, however,
care must be taken not to ignore new policies which intrude when the
doctrine is projected to the foreign-judgments level.
131 Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1895).
132 Perhaps the summary judgment procedure used in this country with some suc-
cess in respect to sister-state judgments can be adapted to this problem area also. See
Comment, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 490, 504 (1962).
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The present article has not pretended to exhaust the relevant poli-
cies, or even exhaustively to discuss the issues which have been raised.
Its purpose has been only to survey the existing theory, to sketch the
outlines of a policy-oriented approach, and to suggest a few working
hypotheses for use in dealing with problems of policy measurement and
classification. The matters it leaves virtually untouched are at least as
important as those which have been considered. Among these may be
mentioned: (1) The question of what constitutes "adjudication" or a
foreign "court" and why these should be the magic words which bring
the policies of conclusiveness into play; (2) The desirability, or other-
wise, of using foreign law to measure the scope and effect of foreign
judgments; 1 33 (3) The relationship, if any, between jurisdiction and
choice of law; (4) The effect on foreign judgments of shifting concepts
of jurisdiction within the United States; (5) Working hypotheses
which might be helpful in deciding cases where several defenses are
raised in combination;134  (6) The special policy problems which
present themselves with respect to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
These matters, and no doubt others beyond the insight of the present
writer, must be investigated before a reappraisal of the foreign-
judgments problem can be considered complete.
I33 The author is presently engaged in a study of the recognition and enforcement
of judgments under German law, and hopes to publish a report of his findings in late
1963 or early 1964.
134 A related problem is the cancellation of the effect of one defense by the non-
existence of another. The holding of the New York courts is that participation of both
parties in procuring a Mexican divorce decree, coupled with actual appearance in Mexico,
precludes a collateral attack on the Mexican decree even though it was rendered without
subject-matter jurisdiction. In effect this rule permits the parties to confer jurisdiction of
the subject matter by personal appearance, even though the issue of jurisdiction is never
actually litigated. This extension of the opportunity-to-litigate theory of Cook v. Cook,
342 U.S. 126 (1951), from the sister-state to the foreign judgments level surely deserves
further consideration. The New York cases are collected in Note, 17 N.Y.U. Intra. L.
Rev. 239 (1961). But cf. Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937).
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